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ECONOMIZING THE TOTALITARIAN TEMPTATION: 
A RISK-AVERSE LIBERAL REALISM FOR POLITICAL 
ECONOMY AND COMPETITION POLICY IN A POST-
NEOLIBERAL SOCIETY 
Joseph V. Coniglio* 
 An increasing number of Americans believe that a new renais-
sance in antitrust enforcement may be just what is needed, across nu-
merous industries, to fix a political economy many feel to be character-
ized by increasing wealth inequality, lack of opportunity, and which is 
“rigged” in favor of incumbents and elites.  To save capitalism, poli-
cymakers must finally show the courage to use antitrust law to take on 
concentrated corporate power, particularly in high-technology indus-
tries, or else risk the devolution of the liberal, capitalist, and democrat-
ic order into totalitarianism. 
This article takes a contrary view.  Yes, there may be serious 
problems with the “neoliberal” order that reached its height at the end 
of the Cold War.  But competition policy is not one of them.  Not only 
does a consumer welfare standard remain the best paradigm for anti-
trust enforcement when considered against alternatives, but it can find 
justification in the unprecedented gains in economic growth and tech-
nological progress that have occurred during the neoliberal period.  
Indeed, a consumer welfare standard may be one of the high points not 
only of neoliberal political economy, but of a broader neoliberal pro-
ject that attempts to view all of society—rather than just the market—
as governable through the logic of wealth maximization. 
This is not to say, however, that there are no problems with ne-
oliberalism—even if its competition policy is sound.  Some of the most 
serious concerns, like increasing wealth inequality, may be far more 
the result of programs in other areas of the American political econo-
my, such as monetary policy.  Indeed, the greatest indictment of neolib-
eralism may not be as a theory of political economy at all, but as a the-
ory of society that would reduce all its organs to economic forces and 
explanations.  While a purely economic approach to antitrust is sound, 
a purely economic theory of society writ large is probably not. 
 
704 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ................................................................................. 704 
II. Modern Theories of Competition Policy...................................... 709 
A. Liberal Theories ............................................................... 709 
B. Illiberal Theories .............................................................. 718 
III. Critical Assessment of Alternative Theories............................... 722 
IV. Positive Assessment of Neoliberal Competition Policy .............. 726 
V. The Other Limits of Antitrust ..................................................... 732 
VI. Conclusion ................................................................................ 737 
 
 
“But the age of chivalry is gone.  That of sophisters, 
             economists, and calculators has succeeded…” 
 
                 – EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
                     REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The past few years have witnessed a renewed and vibrant public 
interest in the proper goals for competition policy in a democratic soci-
ety.1  Encompassing a range of commentators from all corners of the 
greater antitrust community, this debate has centered upon four ques-
tions.  First, has market concentration meaningfully increased over the 
past forty years?  Second, if so, are these increases in concentration 
primarily a result of poor policy choices, or superior firms enjoying 
competitive advantage from efficiencies enabled by innovations in are-
as like information technology?  Third, if poor policy choices were 
made, is it antitrust or other rule regimes that bear substantial responsi-
 
 * Joseph V. Coniglio is an antitrust attorney in the Washington, DC office of Sidley 
Austin LLP. The author gratefully acknowledges Tim Muris and Bill Blumenthal for helpful 
comments and reviewing a final draft of the article, Donald Polden and Danny Sokol for the 
inspiration to write the article, Karen Kazmerzak and Steve Salop for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts, as well as Hannah Ford-Stille, Maggie Cockayne, Robert Sink, and Alex 
Tritell for editorial assistance. The author greatly thanks Santa Clara University School of 
Law for the opportunity to present this article at its “Antitrust and Silicon Valley: New 
Themes and Direction in Competition Law and Policy” symposium. The views of this article 
are solely the author’s and do not in any way necessarily reflect those of Sidley Austin LLP 
or any of its current or former clients. 
 1. See, e.g., Alex Webb, Big Tech Gets Put on Guard by Antitrust Police, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/big-tech-gets-put-on-
guard-by-antitrust-police/2020/01/27/c210f84c-40f7-11ea-99c7-1dfd4241a2fe_story.html; 
Cecilia Kang, House Opens Tech Antitrust Inquiry With Look at Threat to News Media, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/technology/antitrust-
hearing.html; John D. McKinnon, FTC’s New Task Force Could Be Trouble for Big Tech, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftcs-new-task-force-could-be-
trouble-for-big-tech-11551357000. 
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bility?  Fourth, if antitrust bears some blame, should a consumer wel-
fare standard2 be abandoned wholesale, such as through a return to the 
political structuralism of the 1960s,3 or are more incremental changes, 
such as the development of more specific presumptions,4 sufficient to 
set antitrust on the right course for the 21st century?   
Beyond this more esoteric debate amongst the antitrust cogno-
scenti, criticisms of the broader theory of political economy known as 
“neoliberalism”5 continue their crescendo since the 2008 financial cri-
sis.  These criticisms are now noticeably bipartisan.  On the left, com-
mentators continue to associate neoliberal policies with both growing 
economic inequality and real income stagnation for the middle and 
working classes.6  On the right, commentators are increasingly critical 
of neoliberalism’s tendency to see economics only in terms of wealth 
maximization, which they argue has had deleterious effects on the fam-
ily and other traditional institutions.7  Indeed, criticisms of a consumer 
welfare standard—itself an exemplar of the neoliberal outlook—are al-
so becoming bipartisan, both with respect to its alleged undue tolerance 
 
 2. For purposes of this article, “consumer welfare standard” refers more broadly to 
encompass both the total and consumer surplus interpretations by generally denoting some 
measure of neoclassical welfare within a partial equilibrium analysis—either of the market 
as a whole, as with total surplus, or of a part, as with consumer surplus—and is therefore 
proceeded by the indefinite article. This article does not take a position on the ongoing de-
bate as to which measure is proper. Compare Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s 
Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (2013) with Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Pur-
chase Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total 
Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010). 
 3. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 718 
(2017). To be clear, by “political structuralism” I do not mean to invoke the Harvard School, 
which saw market structure as a way to gauge economic performance, understood in terms 
of total surplus, rather than as an end in itself to protect small competitors. See Meese, supra 
note 2. 
 4. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Pre-
sumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards, GEO. UNIV. 
L. CTR.  (2017), 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3025&context=facpub. 
 5. This article’s focus will be on neoliberalism in the specific context of competition 
policy, rather than as a theory of political economy or, more generally still, a comprehensive 
theory of society. However, both latter forms of neoliberalism will also be discussed. 
 6. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013). 
 7. Similar points were made in a noted monologue by popular conservative pundit 
Tucker Carlson. See Tucker Carlson, Monologue, FOX NEWS (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-mitt-romney-supports-the-status-quo-but-
for-everyone-else-its-infuriating. 
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for monopoly,8 as well as its exclusion of political content from anti-
trust enforcement.9   
The bipartisan nature of this dissatisfaction the neoliberal status 
quo provides an occasion to address the current antitrust debate within 
a larger reflection about alternatives to neoliberalism.10  Like all sys-
tems of political economy, neoliberalism can be understood in terms of 
a particular set of principles and institutions.  First, neoliberalism sees 
in economics, and specifically neoclassical wealth-maximization, the 
core basis for market governance.11  As a second principle, like most if 
not all liberal theories, neoliberalism does not generally permit the state 
to intervene in market outcomes to accomplish political ends.12  Final-
ly, but unlike other liberal conceptions of political economy, neoliber-
alism tolerates substantial economic inequalities—either between indi-
viduals or corporations—in as much as they are consistent with 
economic efficiency or growth.13   
The core institutions of neoliberal political economy—and here 
we are now speaking concretely about the United States, but without 
any necessary loss of generality—similarly deviate from other liberal 
paradigms by including institutions reflective of prior “revolutionary” 
challenges, both from below and above.14  On the one hand, liberal cap-
 
 8. For a critique from the right, see Daniel Kishi, Time for a Conservative Anti-
Monopoly Movement, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 19, 2017). 
 9. For a critique from the left, see TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN 
THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018).   
 10. The commentators on neoliberalism are myriad and, as one would expect, present 
divergent perspectives in describing it. For ease of a coherent exegesis, this article draws 
primarily from Michel Foucault’s famous lectures on Biopolitics. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS 248 (Senellart et al. eds., Burchell trans., 2008) (1979). Through 
this Foucauldian lens, by “neoliberalism” I am referring specifically to what Foucault 
termed “American neoliberalism.” See id. at 215-19. “European neoliberalism” or what I 
refer to as “ordoliberalism” will be discussed separately.   
 11. See id. at 247 (“The general form of the market [for neoliberalism] becomes an in-
strument, a tool of discrimination in the debate within the administration…. It is sort of a 
permanent economic tribunal confronting government.”). 
 12. Id. at 218 (describing the “permanent ground of liberal debate” as the permissibility 
of interventionist policies with political aims, and identifying neoliberalism as a reaction 
against this “non-liberalism”). 
 13. See Philip Mirowski, Defining Neoliberalism, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: 
THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 438 (Rob Van Horn & Philip 
Mirowski eds., 2009). 
 14. See generally BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND 
DEMOCRACY (1966).  Moore identifies fascism as a “revolution from above” and com-
munism as a “peasant revolution,” or what we will call a “revolution from below,” and con-
trasts both with liberal capitalist democracy. Broadly speaking, whereas communism is a 
revolution from “below” by virtue of the fourth estate or intellectual-led working class dis-
placing the rule of third estate or commercial class, fascism is a revolution from “above” by 
virtue of the bourgeois order being overturned by a class purporting to embody the values of 
a landed aristocracy or second estate. To be sure, some have argued that the discourse of 
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italist democracy can risk a “revolution from below,” whereby intellec-
tual elites play upon the anxieties of the working class to the end of 
implementing socialist policies of widespread nationalization.15  On the 
other hand, liberal capitalist democracy can also risk a “revolution 
from above,” whereby a class of wealthy elites is able to form an alli-
ance with industry to thwart democratic rule by the bourgeois classes—
while even at times enlisting their support—and establish tight state 
control of the economy consistent with the newly constituted state’s 
political ends.16   
Understood in such a way, perhaps the greatest achievement of 
American neoliberalism—no doubt supported, if not enabled, by the 
United States’ exceptional geopolitical successes in the twentieth cen-
tury—has been its ability to accommodate revolutionary pressures that 
have elsewhere undermined liberal political economies within an 
evolved liberal paradigm.  Specifically, the existence of large welfare 
and administrative states reflects neoliberalism’s assimilation of the 
New Deal’s quasi or incomplete revolution from below as a way to 
safeguard the interests of the working classes against the excesses of 
unfettered capitalism.17  By contrast, neoliberal political economy also 
 
estates reflects an “old notion that society is divided into classes that pursue their class inter-
ests rather than the modern notion that society simply consists of individuals who pursue 
their self-interest” and that “[t]his is certainly not an accurate picture of society today….” 
Eric A. Posner, The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy Perspective 
30 (John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper, No. 540, Nov. 2010). Such a critique would 
seem to be belied by the current and bipartisan uproar against what are characterized as un-
accountable elite classes that act in their own interests and not those of the people, and sug-
gests that even in “revolutionary” systems such as liberal capitalist democracy and—without 
question—communism, it is not invariably the existence of an elite which changes, but ra-
ther its composition. See, e.g., ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1911) (discussing 
the theory of the iron law of oligarchy). Cf. MOORE, supra note 14, at 503 (noting that not 
only was the Russian peasantry willing to keep the Tsar—rather than have him and his en-
tire family assassinated—but that their main goal for increased “village autonomy” re-
mained underachieved, as its “last open expression occurred in the slogan ‘Soviets without 
Communists’ of the Kronstadt rebellion in 1921, whose suppression by the Bolsheviks re-
vealed the ‘secret’ of the Russian revolution…”). 
 15. See MOORE, at 480-81 (recognizing the role of discontented intellectuals without 
ties to the existing order harnessing popular discontent in bringing about a communist revo-
lution); see also JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 145-55 
(1944) (discussing the “sociology of the intellectual”). 
 16. Id. at xvi (recognizing as a “dominant feature” in German national socialism “a co-
alition between the older landed élites and the rising commercial and industrial ones, di-
rected against the lower classes in town and countryside (but able at times to attract signifi-
cant lower-class support on some issues).”). 
 17. This line of thinking reflects sentiments that President Franklin Roosevelt was a 
“traitor to his class.” See generally H.W. BRANDS, TRAITOR TO HIS CLASS: THE 
PRIVILEGED LIFE AND RADICAL PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT (2000). 
While the administrative state that arose with the New Deal is treated in this article as part 
of this quasi-revolution from below, it could also be viewed as part of a quasi-revolution 
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includes both large corporate concerns and a plutocratic class, which 
jointly represent the incorporation of a quasi or incomplete revolution 
from above that in the United States took the form of a reaction against 
the New Deal.18   
Although the outlooks represented by these revolutionary forces 
are absent from the consumer welfare debate—antitrust law, of course, 
presumes the liberal and market principles that these revolutionary par-
adigms reject—criticisms of the broader neoliberal project, of which 
antitrust is an essential part, that emphasize the need for more state in-
tervention in the economy—whether in the name of “order” from 
above or, much more frequently, “equality” from below—are growing 
bolder as faith in the neoliberal project falters.  This faltering puts the 
onus on neoliberal policymakers to defend, or design an alternative to, 
the potentially waning neoliberal consensus—or else risk reliving the 
consequences of totalitarian systems that the twentieth century made 
painfully clear, and for which neoliberalism was designed as an alter-
native.   
This article engages in this type of reflection by considering vari-
ous modern alternatives to neoliberal competition policy, before cri-
tiquing each of them from the perspective of “anti-totalitarian liberal 
realism” that the paper defines.  This article next attempts to provide a 
political justification for neoliberal competition policy by responding to 
Schumpeter’s famous reflections on corporatism in Capitalism, Social-
ism, and Democracy.  The penultimate section attempts to identify are-
as of the neoliberal project other than competition policy where cri-
tiques may be both more needed and more promising.  A brief 
conclusion follows.   
 
from above by a patrician noblesse de robe seeking to rein in the excesses of capitalism for 
the good of the social order. Cf. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 155 (noting the pre-
capitalist origin of European bureaucracy). As the United States lacks this prior history, such 
a characterization would likely seem odd to American ears.   
 18. See generally Kim Phillips-Fein, Business Conservatives and the Mont Pelerin So-
ciety, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT 
COLLECTIVE 280-301 (Rob Van Horn and Philip Mirowski eds., 2009) (describing the rela-
tionship between anti-New Deal sentiment and the Mont Pelerin Society); see also 
FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 216; SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 424 (writing that, with 
respect to many New Deal policies, that “there is a mountain in Switzerland on which con-
gresses of economists have been held which express disapproval of all or most of these 
things.”). Here again, the predominance of the corporate form in late capitalism could also 
be interpreted as part of a quasi revolution from below—that is, a collectivist challenge to 
the rugged individualism of the capitalist entrepreneur as the archetype of the third estate 
and a precursor for a further revolution from below in the form of socialism, in part by creat-
ing an intellectual class that would ultimately become hostile to capitalism. See 
SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 424. 
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II. MODERN THEORIES OF COMPETITION POLICY 
Theories of modern competition policy may fall into one of two 
broad categories that differ with respect to the extent and types of gov-
ernment intervention into market processes they condone.  The first 
broad category comprises liberal theories that do not generally allow 
the state to shape market outcomes to satisfy political ends.  These lib-
eral theories can in turn be distinguished, first, according to whether 
state intervention is nonetheless justifiable on other non-economic 
grounds; and second, whether state intervention is technocratic or for-
malistic in character.  The second broad category comprises illiberal 
theories of political economy that generally permit state interventions 
into market outcomes for political purposes.  These illiberal theories 
can be in turn differentiated, first, according to whether the predomi-
nant mechanism of state control involves ownership of the means of 
production, or merely regulation; and second, whether the state has 
broad control over the economy, or whether the scope of its interven-
tion is generally limited to a subset of politically important sectors. 
A. Liberal Theories 
Liberal theories of competition policy can be differentiated both 
according to whether they envision markets as serving non-economic 
purposes,19 as well as whether the nature of the state’s intervention is 
technocratic or formalistic.  The role of antitrust enforcement in a given 
liberal theory will, of course, vary according to the contemplated rela-
tion between the market and the state.  Should the current neoliberal 
paradigm continue to waver, realizing another variety of liberal politi-
cal economy will depend upon the incentives and abilities of the pow-
ers that be who are in support of it. 
Consistent with our broader definition of neoliberal political 
economy, neoliberal competition policy limits state interventions to 
those that satisfy some criterion of economic welfare maximization.20  
 
 19. To be clear, I do not mean to exclude from liberal theories legislation aimed to pro-
tect, for example, health, safety or morals, which is consistent with even very laissez faire 
liberalism. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL 
LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970 243-62 (2015) (discussing how even during the substantive 
due process period in American law state legislation was upheld if it worked to protect 
health, safety, or morals). Rather, I mean to distinguish between theories of competition pol-
icy that see the purpose of markets as limited to economic goods—even if the state may in-
tervene if a social good is harmed—and theories that see the purpose of markets as serving 
non-economic purposes.   
 20. This article thus sees the Chicago School as an exemplar of neoliberal competition 
policy for defining economic order, and therefore the principle of market regulation, using 
the tools of neoclassical economics, and specifically price theory. See Mirowski, supra note 
13, at 435; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
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In this way, as reflected more broadly in the law and economics tradi-
tion, neoliberal economic policy makes neoclassical welfare economics 
the organizing principle of general market regulation rule regimes, such 
as antitrust.21  In neoliberal competition policy, technocrats administer 
these welfare-maximizing policies through higher order economic 
frameworks, like decision theoretic error-cost analyses.22  These tech-
nocrats apply this economic logic to particular cases through legal re-
gimes and administrative bodies, and are thus consistent with an active 
role for the state.23  The goal of neoliberal competition policy is limited 
to proscribing conduct24 that reduces a measure of economic perfor-
mance or welfare (whether ultimately understood as consumer surplus 
or total surplus).25   
 
925, 932 (1979). To be sure, both the respective total surplus and consumer surplus stand-
ards of the Harvard School and Post-Chicago Schools also employ welfare maximizing 
competition policy frameworks. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Ac-
count of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard 
and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010); Steven C. Salop, Question: 
What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Wel-
fare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER REV. 336 (2010). Rather than constitute populism, these 
approaches thus share the technocratic and welfare maximizing disposition of the Chicago 
School, and therefore are all treated as encompassed by “neoliberal competition policy” as 
this article uses the term. See generally Timothy J. Muris & Jonathan Nuechterlein, Chicago 
and Its Discontents (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper, No. 19-15, 2019); William E. 
Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Con-
duct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1. 
 21. For the seminal antitrust statement, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX 7, 405 (1973). 
 22. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); C. Frederick Beckner III 
& Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999). 
 23. Mirowski, supra note 13, at 436. 
 24. For a statement in the case law, see, e.g., Verizon Communs. Inc., v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). This is to say that neoliberal competi-
tion policy is not typically understood to include exploitative offenses, such as excessive 
pricing—which, rather than rejected on formalist grounds, involves a technocratic judge-
ment aimed to protect dynamic efficiency. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton and Ken Heyer, Ex-
traction vs. Extension: The Basis For Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm 
Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 285 (2008). 
 25. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-15 (1978). The author readi-
ly acknowledges at the outset both the historical ambiguity of the term “consumer welfare 
standard” as denoting either total surplus or consumer surplus. See Barak Orbach, Was the 
Crisis in Antitrust a Trojan Horse, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 881, 899-900 (2014). But see Daniel 
A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 835 (2014). As noted above, both interpretations constitute “neoliberal 
competition policy” for purposes of this paper. Of course, the consumer surplus interpreta-
tion of the post-Chicago school may be said to deviate from neoliberal policy in as much as 
it inherently takes into account concerns of distributive justice—namely, privileging the sur-
plus of consumers over producers. This is true, but only in the sense of whose economic 
welfare counts, not that economic welfare is not what counts. Indeed, prominent post-
Chicago scholars have expressly highlighted the difficulties involved in using antitrust to 
address distributional problems such as wealth inequality. See Jonathan Baker and Steve 
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While neoliberal competition policy, as well as neoliberal political 
economy more generally, may be under increasing scrutiny, it is possi-
ble that continued advances in technology will present a basis for sus-
taining the neoliberal order without a need for substantial modifications 
to either its governing principles or core institutions.26  That is, on this 
hyper-neoliberal view, continued technological progress may enable 
the existing neoliberal system to accommodate renewed revolutionary 
forces through gains in productivity that, if distributed properly, could 
increase the wealth of the middle class in a way that prevents revolu-
tion.  Similarly, continued democratization of the means of communi-
cation might counter the rise of totalitarianism, which has historically 
relied upon the centralized control of information.27  On this hyper-
neoliberal view, the crisis in neoliberalism is not real, but only appar-
ent. 
For our purposes, “classical liberalism” refers to an earlier con-
ception of liberal political economy that in America specifically can be 
linked with laissez faire theories of substantive due process during the 
Gilded Age.28  Like neoliberalism, classical liberalism need not envi-
sion the market as serving any broader social purpose; rather, its goal is 
economic, specifically the promotion of value-enhancing exchanges.29  
Classical liberalism differs from neoliberalism, however, in that an ef-
ficient and ordered market is not seen as a technocratic creation of the 
state, but as separate and self-sustaining, if not also a “natural” phe-
 
Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2015) (noting how 
interpersonal utility comparisons are beyond standard economic models); cf. Daniel A. 
Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171 (2016). 
 26. In describing this view, I am thinking about what has been termed by its critics the 
“Californian Ideology,” namely, “a profound faith in the emancipatory potential of new in-
formation technologies” where everyone is both “hip and rich.” See Richard Barbarook & 
Andy Cameron, The Californian Ideology, IMAGINARY FUTURES, 
http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/2007/04/17/the-californian-ideology-2/. 
 27. In the words of President Ronald Reagan, “Technology will make it increasingly 
difficult for the state to control the information its people receive …. The Goliath of totali-
tarianism will be brought down by the David of the Microchip.” Ronald Reagan, Speech at 
London’s Guildhall (June 14, 1989). 
 28. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Legal Thought, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
653-55 (2015). 
 29. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 118 (noting that, for classical liberalism, “[t]he most 
that was asked of the state was that it supervise the smooth running of the market, that is to 
say, that it ensure respect for the freedom of those involved in the exchange.”); Mirowski, 
supra note 13, at 434. By characterizing classical liberalism in this way, this article does not 
mean to exclude from this view that idea that “[t]he rules of law, particularly the rules of 
private law, make possible and implement economic planning.” See, e.g., ERNST-JOACHIM 
MESTMÄCKER, A LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT LAW 23 (2007). Rather, the idea is that the pur-
pose of market activity, and therefore the legal systems that are instrumental to it, are under-
stood in the economic terms of value-enhancing exchange or efficiency, and not any larger 
social good. 
712 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
nomenon.30  As such, unlike neoliberalism, both an extensive adminis-
trative state geared toward correcting market failure, as well as a wel-
fare state to reduce absolute poverty, are out of place in classical liber-
alism.31  However, plutocratic and corporate power have, at least in the 
United States during the Gilded Age, ultimately dominated this liberal 
and laissez faire instance of political economy.32 
Although competition policy is not inconsistent with classical lib-
eralism, it takes a more formalistic and common law-like character 
rooted in property and contract principles to promote freedom of ex-
change, rather than a technocratic means of bringing about a utilitarian 
understanding of competition.33  In the United States, the paradigmatic 
antitrust formalism has been a focus on intent, and is typified by United 
States v. Standard Oil, which made anticompetitive intent the defining 
 
 30. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 61-62, 247. This point is consistently overlooked by 
critics of neoliberal competition policy, who contend that it presumes the existence of “natu-
ral” or “inevitable” market forces that correct inefficiencies and underlie its laissez faire ori-
entation. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly 
Debate, 9(3) JECLAP 131, 132 (2018). But this is not correct. See Joseph V. Coniglio, Why 
The ‘New Brandeis Movement’ Gets Antitrust Wrong, LAW360 (Apr. 24, 2018). While a 
mischaracterization, it is an understandable one: it reflects a failure to recognize, among 
other things, a higher order difference between the philosophical priors of classical liberals 
who, like other early moderns, posited objectively true universal laws of nature (of which 
economics was a part), and the respective pragmatism and antirealism of neoliberal thinkers 
like Posner and Friedman, who deny their existence. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, 
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); MILTON FRIEDMAN, RECONSIDERING 
LOGICAL POSITIVISM (1999). It is also understandable in light of both the recognized ten-
dency of neoliberals to characterize the market in naturalistic terms, as well as the lack of a 
unified view amongst thinkers associated with neoliberalism on very this point. See 
Mirowski, supra note 13, at 435. The incorporation of a subjective theory of value, begin-
ning with marginalism, is a further and related distinguishing feature between neoliberalism 
and at least some classical liberal theories that posited an objective theory of value. See 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT, 1870-1970 28, 92 (2015) (placing with Jevons the shift to a subjective theory of 
value and noting the criticism marginalism originally faced for this orientation). Indeed, the 
shift to a subjective value contributed toward the rejection of the view of the market as a 
natural order. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising the Progressive State, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
1063, 1075 (2017). 
 31. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 247 (writing that “in classical liberalism the govern-
ment was called on to respect the form of the market and laisser-faire” whereas in neoliber-
alism “laisser-faire is turned into a do-not-laissez-faire government, in the name of a law of 
the market which will enable its activities to be measured and assessed ….”). 
 32. See PETER F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 4-5 (1993) (noting how, since 
the turn of the last century, “no one has matched in power and visibility the likes of Morgan, 
Rockefeller, Carnegie or Ford in the United States. . .”); WU, supra note 9, at 24-28. 
 33. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 118-19. For a discussion of the relation between dif-
ferent formalistic and technocratic theories of antitrust enforcement, see Joseph V. Coniglio, 
Antitrust and Economic Liberty: A Policy Shift from the Trump Administration?, 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L N. AM. COLUMN (Jan. 2018) (highlighting the difference be-
tween theories of economic liberty rooted in the common law and the utilitarian-technocratic 
approach of the Chicago School).   
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element of both concerted restraints of trade and unilateral monopoliza-
tion.34  As an alternative to neoliberalism, a return to classical liberal-
ism may find support among right libertarians who seek to dismantle 
both the administrative and welfare states without pursuing aggressive 
programs to curb the power of the plutocratic class or concentrated 
corporate interests. 
European ordoliberalism presents a third distinct variety of liberal 
competition policy that, unlike classical liberalism,35 sees competition 
law as a means to address perceived social ills with laissez faire capi-
talism36 to protect individual autonomy understood in the positive sense 
of participation and self-determination in economic life.37  As reflected 
 
 34. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (looking to the com-
mon law to interpret Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and framing the unreasonableness 
of Standard Oil’s behavior in terms of an “intent and purpose to exclude”). See Keith N. 
Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization, in ANTITRUST L. AND ECON. 87 (Keith 
Hylton, ed. 2010) (noting how the specific intent approach dominated monopolization juris-
prudence until Alcoa). Cf. Richard Epstein, An Unapologetic Defense of the Classical Lib-
eral Constitution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 145, 155 n.45 (2015) (citing the Standard Oil case as 
an example of antitrust enforcement consistent with classical liberal principles). 
 35. To be sure, and as we will suggest, there are strong similarities between classical 
liberal thinkers like Smith and ordoliberals like Eucken in seeing the law as a “guardian of a 
system of individual rights, contracts and competition.” See, e.g., MESTMÄCKER, supra note 
29, at 24. However, unlike classical liberalism, ordoliberalism recognizes an enhanced role 
for state intervention to account for what it perceives as deleterious social effects from capi-
talism, see FOUCAULT, supra note 10, 106 (describing how ordoliberals sought to define 
“the economic rationality that will make it possible to nullify the social irrationality of capi-
talism.”), in a way that is in tension with the classical liberal conception of the market as a 
natural or “spontaneous” order. Id. at 120 (noting that for the ordoliberals competitive order 
“will only appear and produce its effects under certain conditions which have to be carefully 
and artificially constructed.”). Hayek’s liberalism is particularly interesting as in this con-
text: he would not fit well in the neoliberal category due to his anti-technocratic bent, see, 
e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 80 (1948), and his emphasis on the rule of law as inherently constraining 
state intervention. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 331 (R. 
Homowy ed., 1960). The question of whether Hayek is closer to this article’s understanding 
of ordoliberalism or classical liberalism is complex, but it would appear that his view of 
spontaneous market order, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948), and his disdain for “constructivist rational-
ism,” Friedrich A. Hayek, Kinds of Rationalism, 15 ECON. STUD. QUARTERLY (1965), 
would incline him against ordoliberalism’s phenomenological project of creating competi-
tion. See FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 120; Nils Goldschmidt & Hermann 
Rauchenschwandtner, The Philosophy of the Social Market Economy: Michel Foucault’s 
Analysis of Ordoliberalism, 11-15, No. 07/4 FREIBURG DISCUSSION PAPERS ON CONST. 
ECON, https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/aluord/074.html. 
 36. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 119-20, 242-3; see also Ralf Ptak, Neoliberalism in 
Germany, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL 
THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 102 (noting “the dedicated effort to resolve what German ordoliber-
als conceived as the social question.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Manuel Wörsdörfer, On the Economic Ethics of Walter Eucken, in 60 
YEARS OF SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: FORMATION, DEVELOPMENT AND PERSPECTIVES 
OF A PEACEMAKING FORMULA 25-27 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung ed., 2013). 
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in the work of founding ordoliberal political economist Walter Eucken, 
ordoliberalism is concerned that laissez faire capitalism can result in 
spiritual and moral alienation38 that undermines the foundations for the 
broader social order of which the market economy is a part by reducing 
man to a state analogous to that envisioned by Weber’s “Iron Cage.”39  
In the ordoliberal view, the prevention of these negative social conse-
quences is not a task for technocrats,40 but one to be solved by the rule 
of law.41  As originally conceived, ordoliberalism may be therefore in 
tension with not only concentrated corporate power, but also a large 
administrative bureaucracy.  However, it may not necessarily be in ten-
sion with a large welfare state.42 
As a way to prevent firm abuses that increase market power and 
limit individual autonomy, competition law functions as a “disempow-
ering” force and plays a central role in ordoliberal political economy.43  
While it has evolved over time, the essence of ordoliberal competition 
 
 38. Id. at 32-34 (discussing how higher-order moral and theological concerns played a 
role in shaping early ordoliberal thought); FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 242 (“[Ordoliberal 
society] involves acting so that the individual, to use the classical and fashionable terminol-
ogy of the time, is not alienated from his work environment, from the time of his life, from 
his household, his family, and from the natural environment … The enterprise society imag-
ined by ordoliberals is therefore a society for the market and a society against the market, a 
society oriented towards the market and a society that compensates for the effects of the 
market in the realm of values and existence.”). 
 39. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 61, 
123 (Parsons trans., Routledge Classics, 1930) (1905). 
 40. By distancing ordoliberalism from a technocratic theory of liberalism, I do not 
mean to overlook either its phenomenological underpinnings, see Rainer Klump & Manuel 
Wörsdörfer, On the Affiliation of Phenomenology and Ordoliberalism: Links between Ed-
mund Husserl, Rudolf and Walter Eucken, 18 EURO. J. OF HIST. OF ECON. THOUGHT 551, 
556-67 (2011), or the importance of the state creating the conditions for competition. 
FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 120. The distinction is that, whereas in neoliberalism the law 
serves the technocratic purpose of determining wealth-maximizing outcomes, in ordoliberal-
ism the rule of law has an inherently constraining effect on government intervention, see, 
e.g., DAVID GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: 
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 247-8 (1998), grounded in its Kantian and non-utilitarian privi-
leging of individual liberty. Put differently, on a neoliberal view, even if it is in practice 
more laissez faire, such a result is by contrast derived from a technocratic calculus that may 
be subject to change a posteriori—i.e., assumptions of market self-correction regarding ex-
cessive pricing and dynamic efficiency—rather than a more a priori conception of individu-
al liberty, such as Eucken’s conception of autonomy. See Wörsdörfer, supra note 37, at 25-
26; David Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition 
Law and the “New” Europe, 42 AM. J. COMPETITION L. 25, 39 (1994). 
 41. See Wörsdörfer, supra note 37, at 23; GERBER, supra note 40, at 245-48. 
 42. See Viktor Vanberg, The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism, No. 
04/11 FREIBURG DISCUSSION PAPERS ON ECON. ORDER at 2, 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/4343/1/04_11bw.pdf (discussing the ordoliberals’ 
tolerance of social insurance policies). 
 43. Wörsdörfer, supra note 37, at 27 (describing Eucken’s notion of competition law as 
disempowering market power that reduces individual liberty). 
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policy can be reduced to the prohibition of conduct that impermissibly 
concentrates market structures beyond what is consistent with effective 
competition44 to protect individual liberty.45  That is, although not a 
policy of no fault monopoly—some bad conduct or abuse is re-
quired46—ordoliberalism sees harms to markets in terms of their effects 
on market structure or, its demand side variant, consumer choice.47  As 
a broader theory of political economy, ordoliberalism may be an attrac-
tive alternative to neoliberalism for social conservatives48 seeking to 
preserve liberal economic order but find neoliberalism’s hedonistic out-
 
 44. See, e.g., Case 6-72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. v. 
Comm’n, [1973] ECR 215 ¶ 26; see also Sigfrido M. Ramirez Perez & Sebastian van de 
Scheur, The Evolution of the Law on Articles 85 and 86 EEC, in THE HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW 19 (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike Schweitzer eds., 
2013) (defining the ordoliberal goal of competition policy as “the protection of effective and 
undistorted competition”); Peter Behrens, The ordoliberal concept of ‘Abuse’ of a Dominant 
Position and its Impact on Article 102 TFEU, EUROPA-KOLLEG HAMBURG, INSTITUTION 
FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, No. 7/15, at 16 (2015) (“Hence, from an ordoliberal point of 
view, a restraint of competition may be found wherever (1) the number of freely competing 
producers is artificially reduced in ways that do not result from the normal process of com-
petition itself, and (2) where this reduces the scope of alternatives among which consumers 
may freely [choose].”). For examples of arguably ordoliberal policy in European case law, 
see, e.g., Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, [2010] ECRI-9555 ¶ 170; Case 
T-219/99, British Airways v. Comm’n, [2003] ECR II-5917, ¶ 264 (“Article [102 TFEU] 
does not require it to be demonstrated that the conduct in question had any actual or direct 
effect on consumers. Competition law concentrates on protecting the market structure from 
artificial distortions…”); Cases 6/73 and 7/73, Institutio Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and 
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission [1974] ECR 223, ¶¶ 31-33. 
 45. Cf. Heike Schweitzer & Kiran Klaus Patel, EU Competition Law in Historical Con-
text, in THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW 222-23 (Patel and 
Schweitzer eds., 2013) (linking the structural approach of the European Court of Justice, as 
embodied in Continental Can, with a “rights-based approach”). 
 46. To be sure, a no fault monopoly offense has been associated with early ordoliberal 
thought. See GERBER, supra note 40, at 251-52 (describing early ordoliberals hostility to 
monopoly); Wörsdörfer, supra note 37, at 27. However, as it developed, ordoliberalism em-
braced more nuanced theories of competitive order, such as the “as-if” principle and the dis-
tinction between performance and impediment competition, see, e.g., David Gerber, Consti-
tutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the “New” 
Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25, 52-53 (1994), including the notion of proscribing conduct 
that artificially harms “workable” or effective competition, as attributed to it here. Indeed 
this development is consistent with Foucault’s understanding of the ordoliberal view as one 
where “pure competition is never attained” and “must and can only be an objective, an ob-
jective thus presupposing an indefinitely active policy.” FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 120. 
 47. See Peter Behrens, The Consumer Choice Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and 
Its Impact Upon EU Competition Law, EUROPA-KOLLEG HAMBURG, INST. FOR EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 25 (Discussion Paper No. 1/14, 2014), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/95925/1/780714202.pdf. 
 48. See, e.g., Yuval Levin, Edmund Burke’s Economics of Flourishing, in ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 94-95 (Michael R. Strain, Stan A. Veuger eds., 2016) 
(noting both how Burke was “a friend of markets to the extent that they support and uphold 
the complex social order that enables human flourishing” and that markets can produce the 
very “social dislocation, insecurity, and breakdown” that endanger moral community). 
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look deleterious to traditional institutions such as religion and the fami-
ly.49 
Another possible liberal successor to neoliberalism can be under-
stood as a family of theories bearing resemblance to what has been 
termed “libertarian paternalism.”50  Although an exegesis of this view 
lacks the historical context of other liberal theories, this approach ap-
pears to share an affinity with ordoliberalism in viewing markets within 
a broader social context—specifically, the conditions for rational 
choice.51  However, whereas ordoliberalism understands this broader 
context in spiritual or moral terms, the inquiry of libertarian paternal-
ism has the worldly focus on the individual preferences behind market 
behavior.52  For libertarian paternalism, we can therefore say that state 
intervention is justifiable in the sense of helping to shape preferences to 
reduce bias and achieve better overall social outcomes.53  For this rea-
son, unlike ordoliberalism, libertarian paternalism appears to be con-
sistent with heavily technocratic governance conducted by a powerful 
administrative state. 
While libertarian paternalism remains an emerging theory, it is 
likely that the incorporation of behavioral economics into antitrust law 
would form a core part of its competition policy.54  Specifically, on this 
type of view the strong neoclassical assumptions of rationality held by 
neoliberalism would be abandoned in favor of more modest assump-
 
 49. Wörsdörfer, supra note 37, at 15 (noting that Eucken “emphasized the need for an 
ethical-religious reformation” and that Eucken strove not just “for an ordoliberal post-war 
economic and social system, but also a Christian-based ordoliberal one”). 
 50. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 175 (2003). 
 51. Id. at 176. Understood in such a way, there may be some historical context for lib-
ertarian paternalism as a successor to American institutionalism, which largely failed to ar-
ticulate an adequate theory of economic behavior within the larger social context it saw rel-
evant to economic decision-making. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and 
the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L. J. 499, 525-26 (2011). Indeed, institutionalist 
theories have also been linked to proposals that would replace a consumer welfare standard 
entirely, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled, 
UNIV. PENN. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 17-19 (2018), which is consistent with the characterization 
of libertarian paternalism as a deviation from neoliberal competition policy, notwithstanding 
a common technocratic orientation.   
 52. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003) (discussing how preferences can be ill-
formed through default rules, framing effects, and starting points). 
 53. Id. (describing the libertarian paternalist’s goal to “steer people’s choices in wel-
fare-promoting directions…”). 
 54. For examples of such an approach, see Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, 
Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527 (2011); Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of 
Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolution-
ary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 
(2011). 
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tions that, as a general proposition, would increase the bounds of anti-
trust intervention.55  By seeking to correct individual preferences and 
market biases, libertarian paternalism would seem to support an anti-
trust regime that, in effect, goes beyond a conduct requirement and ad-
dresses outcomes directly for their failure to meet prior socio-economic 
goals.56  A shift to this form of political economy might be favored by 
those on the center-left who take issue with neoliberalism’s underlying 
assumptions of firm rationality and failure to consider either larger dis-



















 55. See, e.g., see Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 
IND. L.J. 1527, 1553-67 (2011); see also Maurice Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?: 
Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 
(2010). 
 56. Libertarian paternalism should thus be distinguished from the post-Chicago School, 
whose game-theoretic models expand upon, rather than undermine, standard rational choice 
models. See J. Thomas Rosch, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations at the Confer-
ence on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1, 2 (Jan. 6, 
2010),  https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/managing-
irrationality-some-observations-behavioral-economics-and-creation-consumer-
financial/100106financial-products.pdf; see also Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Mis-
behavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 
1537 (2012) (noting that “the assumption of firm rationality underlying price theory and 
game theory is, in turn, at the core of the Chicago School, Post-Chicago School, and the 
Harvard School approaches to antitrust”). This is to suggest that while certain assumptions 
no doubt vary on the Chicago, Harvard, and post-Chicago theories that result in enforcement 
differentials, they share a common underlying commitment to both firm rationality and ad-
herence to an economic welfare standard which, as distinct from libertarian paternalism and 
institutionalism, allows them to be (broadly) categorized as “neoliberal” theories of competi-
tion policy.   
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Table 1 summarizes these four liberal theories. 
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B. Illiberal Theories 
As noted prior, in contrast to liberal theories, what we will term 
“illiberal” theories envision an express role for the state to intervene in 
market processes for political purposes.  Illiberal theories can first be 
differentiated according to whether the state’s interventions contem-
plate either regulation, including monitored cartelization,57 or outright 
 
 57. This is relevant to the case of German fascism. See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and 
Democracy: A Case Study from German Fascism, U. MICH. L. SCH. SCHOLARSHIP 
REPOSITORY 3-4 (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1266&context=law_econ_curr
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state ownership of the means of production.  Illiberal theories can also 
be distinguished with respect to whether the state’s interventions are 
general or economy wide—i.e., “totalitarian”—or whether they are typ-
ically limited to specific sectors of the economy that are deemed to 
have a particular political importance—i.e., “authoritarian.”58  Like lib-
eral theories, illiberal theories will also differ according to their roles 
for competition policy, and the interests within society that favor them 
as potential successors to neoliberal political economy.   
At least four major illiberal theories are identifiable across the 
modern history of political economy.  The first of these can generally 
be considered “mercantilism” or, as we will term it for purposes of ana-
lyzing its instantiation in competition policy, “industrial policy”—that 
is, state interventions into market outcomes being justified within the 
context of a larger geopolitical zero sum game.59  Market interventions 
based on industrial policy need not be economy wide, and can in prin-
ciple be limited to those industries that are deemed to have particular 
national or geopolitical importance.  Furthermore, rather than eliminate 
private ownership of the means of production, mercantilist or industrial 
policy ends can be achieved through regulation and subsidies,60 and 
may be favored by those on the nationalist right.  Indeed, China’s com-
petition policy, which is rooted in its conception of socialist market 
economy, may provide an example of how competition law can be 
merged with national interests within a broader neo-mercantilist para-
digm of political economy.61 
Another authoritarian theory of illiberal competition policy can be 
termed “progressivism.”  Unlike industrial policy, however, progres-
sive paradigms for political economy like the New Deal are typically 
motivated by domestic political concerns, such as preventing revolu-
 
ent (highlighting the role of cartelization in Germany’s pre-World War II development); 
GERBER, supra note 40, at 115-64. 
 58. In using the term “totalitarian,” I do not mean total—or in the case of “authoritari-
an,” partial—coordination between the various powers that be (e.g., in Germany, the “Quar-
tet”) or “estates” as discussed prior. Instead, as this article’s focus is competition policy and 
political economy, by “totalitarian” and “authoritarian” I employ analogous usages respec-
tively connoting total or partial control of the market by the state.   
 59. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 52-54. 
 60. A historical example of mercantilist policies in the United States would be Henry 
Clay’s American System, which included selective tariffs, a national bank, and agricultural 
subsidies. See Senator Henry Clay, The American System, Speech before the Senate, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/AmericanSystem.pdf. 
 61. See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 20-26 (2013). 
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tion from below,62 rather than a geopolitical grand strategy.63  Further-
more, whereas industrial policy can in theory limit its interventions to 
regulatory policies and subsidies, progressivism contemplates national-
ization or socialization of certain industries or economic sectors that 
are of particular and popular political significance.64  For progressiv-
ism, antitrust still can thus play an important role as a tool to break up 
large concentrations of economic power that offend democratic princi-
ples, and even without the commission of any bad conduct—that is, a 
no fault monopoly offense,65 as favored by some contemporary pro-
gressive commentators.66 
Finally, there are “totalitarian” theories of political economy that 
envision general state control over the economy.67  In the case of so-
cialism, control is implemented through widespread programs of state 
ownership of the means of production;  in the case of fascism, control 
is effectuated through regulation—including state sanctioned carteliza-
tion—while generally leaving the means of production in private 
hands.68  As noted above, socialism can be brought about through a 
 
 62. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 
336 (1963) (“Despite this encroachment of government on traditional business prerogatives, 
the New Deal could advance impressive claims to be regarded as a ‘savior of capitalism.’ ” ). 
 63. Nonetheless, “progressive” antitrust policies can be said to have historically in-
volved “protectionism” in the sense of protecting special interests. See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Progressive Antitrust, 2018 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 71, 76. For a discussion of the regulatory 
capture problem for progressive political economy more generally, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Appraising the Progressive State, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1063 (2017). 
 64. See, e.g., Paul Starr, Liberalism After Socialism, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Fall 
1991), https://prospect.org/article/liberalism-after-socialism (noting how in the 20th century 
traditional socialism was replaced with “programs that called for limited nationalization and 
the extension of welfare-state measures.”). 
 65. An example would be Senator Hart’s Monopolization Reform Act of 1976.  See S. 
3429, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 122 CONG REC. 13,872 (1976).  This characterization of 
progressivism differs from that in A. Douglas Melamed & Nicolas Petit, The Misguided As-
sault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets, 54 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. 741, 744-45 (2019) where progressive views are distinguished from both a no-fault 
monopoly paradigm and the New Brandeis movement.  For a different view still, see Her-
bert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 71, 76. 
 66. See generally Zephyr Teachout, Corporate Rules and Political Rules: Antitrust as 
Campaign Finance Reform (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2384182, 
2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384182. Another related pro-
gressive antitrust proposal that has been suggested involves per se bans on vertical integra-
tion for some companies. See Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019). 
 67. Cf. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 421, (defining “(centralist) socialism as that 
organization of society in which the means of production are controlled, and the decisions 
on how and what to produce and on who is to get what, re made by public authority instead 
of by privately- owned and privately-managed firms.”). 
 68. See id. MESTMÄCKER, supra note 29, at 29 (noting how both communism and na-
tional socialism relied on “central economic planning” and that national socialism demon-
strated how “central planning can be implemented without the formal expropriation of the 
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revolution from below by the working class against a ruling class that 
lacks the support of a sufficiently strong middle class.69  Fascism, by 
contrast, represents an attempt at revolution from above that can be 
achieved by wealthy landed elites allying with commercial power 
against the petit bourgeoisie and working classes, even if at times gain-
ing their support on non-economic grounds.70  Because they both envi-
sion general state control of the economy, antitrust is generally not 
consistent with either socialist or fascist forms of political economy.71 
 
Table 2 summarizes these four illiberal theories. 
 
 
Table 2: Illiberal 
Theories of         





















• Antitrust has little 






• Antitrust has little 











• Antitrust may 
prohibit concen-
trated market 
structure per se, 
even without the 
commission of 





• Antitrust is a po-






means of production” as the “ ‘ socialization’ of cartels proved them to be efficient organisa-
tions for economic planning”). Socialist theories can vary between those that eschew market 
forms of control entirely and theories that integrate market mechanisms within a socialist 
economy. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 421-22.  
 69. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 228. 
 70. Id. at 436-38; 448-50. 
 71. This holds true in the limited American experience with such ideologies. See, e.g., 
Daniel A. Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I Learned in 1912, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 2025, 2032 (2015) (noting how socialist candidate Eugene Debs proposed abolishing 
the antitrust laws). 
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III. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
Before evaluating each of these specific forms of competition pol-
icy, it is worth developing the normative criteria by which such an 
analysis will be conducted—that is, “risk-averse anti-totalitarian liberal 
realism.”72  Although the limits of this article make a full exegesis of 
these first principles impracticable, a few key premises can be said 
plainly.73  The first is that the lessons of the twentieth century teach us 
that societies should avoid totalitarian forms of political economy so as 
to not repeat the atrocities that regimes of this kind have committed.74  
Policymakers of goodwill across the political spectrum should be uni-
fied in seeking to articulate a paradigm that overcomes these revolu-
tionary forces so as to protect individual liberty, support continued 
economic growth, and foster technological progress. 
The “risk-averse” nature of this anti-totalitarianism also grounds 
arguments against classical liberalism and progressivism as organizing 
principles for competition policy.  At the institutional level, as noted 
above, while classical liberalism is historically consistent with the 
dominance of both concentrated corporate power and a plutocratic 
class, the ideal of classical liberals would typically include neither wel-
fare nor administrative states.  As such, classical liberalism would pro-
vide an effective check against socialism and revolution from below, 
which could seek to make use of both the welfare and administrative 
states for its ends.75  However, the wholesale dismantling of both the 
welfare and administrative states could dangerously increase the risk of 
 
 72. In discussing “liberal realism” in the context of political economy and competition 
policy, I mean to connote a theory different than those that exist in the fields of political the-
ory or international relations.  See, e.g., MATT SLEAT, LIBERAL REALISM: A REALIST 
THEORY OF LIBERAL POLITICS (2013); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Toward a Liberal Realist Foreign 
Policy: A Memo for the Next President, HARV. MAG. (Mar.-Apr. 2008). As far as the author 
knows, the theory of this article may or may not be consistent with either view.   
 73. As the astute reader will have noted, the principle of anti-totalitarianism may be 
said to follow from the liberal principle, making the former redundant.  As will be clear in 
their exposition, the anti-totalitarian principle operates at the level of political economy and 
rejects the general coordination between the political and economic estates that occurs in 
both socialism and fascism which has been defined above.  The liberal principle, by con-
trast, operates at a higher plane, so to speak, in defending the autonomy of the individual 
against both challenges from both the right—as we will suggest, in the form of ordoliberal-
ism—and left—as we will suggest, in the form of libertarian paternalism. The article’s real-
ist posture is, by contrast, directed against the hyper-neoliberal and mercantilist views.   
 74. See, e.g., ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1973); 
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951). 
 75. Cf. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 206 (“[Bureaucracy] is an inevitable comple-
ment to modern economic development and it will be more than ever essential in a socialist 
commonwealth.”); ARENDT, supra note 74, at 318 (noting that the “October Revolution’s 
amazingly easy victory occurred in a country where a despotic and centralized bureaucracy 
governed…”). 
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a revolution from above by removing the institutional powers able to 
counterbalance any alliance between established wealth and concen-
trated corporate power seeking to use fascism as a way to protect their 
economic interests but to the grave detriment of the rest of society.76 
Progressivism, by contrast, sees powerful administrative and wel-
fare states as necessary to protect the interests of the working classes, 
and is hostile to the existence of both plutocratic and concentrated cor-
porate power.  In the United States, the paradigmatic progressive polit-
ical program was the New Deal.  Whereas the first part of the New 
Deal included a host of regulations empowering the administrative 
state and placing regulatory obligations on business, the second part of 
the New Deal included Social Security and tax increases.77  Even 
though progressivism might therefore provide an adequate check 
against the imposition of fascism by an alliance of private power, the 
elimination of any substantial checks against the abuse of public power 
risks progressive institutions being utilized by intellectual elites rousing 
the working classes to bring about, and achieve power in,78 a socialist 
political economy.79 
In addition to this risk aversion to totalitarian political economy, a 
certain realism about the present historical moment represents another 
basis for critiquing some of the theories of competition policy dis-
cussed above.  While Burke’s “age of chivalry” may be lost and utopia 
never to come, humanity lives better than it once did, and that should 
count for something.  This is to say that, in lieu of believing that a lib-
eral and democratic end of history remains the birthright of all man-
kind, or attempting to turn back globalization, policymakers should be 
concerned about losing what unprecedented but fragile progress mo-
dernity has actually made in improving the lives of many, many mil-
lions who were once in poverty both in the West and around the world.   
The hyper-neoliberal approach—namely, that increased techno-
logical progress will prove a sufficient condition for sustaining the ne-
oliberal order—can be faulted on these realist grounds, as the full im-
 
 76. See MOORE, supra note 14, at xxiii.   
 77. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 334-38 (1948) 
(distinguishing between an “initial New Deal” where “[f]armers got the AAA. Business got 
the NRA codes. Labor got wage-and-hour provisions … The middle classes got the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation, securities regulation, and other reforms” and a “second New 
Deal” that included both a “drastic new ‘wealth tax’ ”  and the Social Security Act). 
 78. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 154 (noting that “though intellectuals have not cre-
ated the labor movement, they have yet worked it up into something that differs substantial-
ly from what it would have been without them”). But cf. ARENDT, supra note 74, at 458 
(“The aggressiveness of totalitarianism springs not from its lust for power…but only for 
ideological reasons: to make the world consistent, to prove that its respective supersense has 
been right.”). 
 79. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 206-07. 
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plications of the New Economy and on liberal economic order are not 
yet fully understood.  It may be that the golden age of technological 
progress and economic growth is already gone and therefore of little 
promise toward continued middle class expansion.80  It may be that the 
social consequences of rapid innovation in the Internet economy are in 
large part increased group polarization and extremism that, in a hetero-
geneous society, ultimately leads to fragmentation, violence, and the 
breakdown of liberal economic order.81  Finally, it may be that even 
notwithstanding a liberal effect of democratizing access to ideas, 
goods, and people, a reinvigorated bureaucracy concerned about ine-
quality chills continued technological progress.82  All of these possibili-
ties, and still many more, make the hyper-neoliberal paradigm too 
speculative for policymakers to stake the future of liberal economic or-
der on.   
An unabashed program of industrial policy, by contrast, suffers 
from a more subtle form of idealism.  On the one hand, the recognition 
of nation states as self-interested actors in competition with one another 
within a sovereignty-based framework has long been a dominant view 
for thinking about international order in “realist” terms.83  Over the ne-
oliberal period, however, the immersion of the contemporary nation 
state within a globalized economy of ideas, goods, people and supply 
chains has resulted in not only unprecedented economic growth and 
prosperity around the world, but relative peace.84  A turn toward indus-
trial policy, even in the limited case of antitrust, risks contributing to 
the undermining of not only economic growth and neutral rules-based 
legal frameworks—such as antitrust as an apolitical, value neutral, and 
technocratic enterprise85—but also global peace and stability, with po-
 
 80. See, e.g., ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH (2016). 
 81. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, John M. Olin L. & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 91, 22-23 (1999). 
 82. See, e.g., Open Markets Institute Applauds Sen. Warren’s Call to Break Up Ama-
zon, OPEN MARKETS INST. (Sept. 14, 2018), https://openmarketsinstitute.org/releases/open-
markets-institute-applauds-sen-warrens-call-break-amazon/. 
 83. Here, I am referring to what is commonly understood as the “Westphalian system.” 
 84. See Joseph S. Nye, Will the Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea, 96 
FOREIGN AFF. 10, 12 (2017) (noting that “the demonstrable success of the [liberal] order in 
helping secure and stabilize the world over the past seven decades has led to a strong con-
sensus that defending, deepening, and extending this system has been and continues to be 
the central task of U.S. foreign policy”); see also HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER 368-
69 (2014). Of course, there have long been skeptics about the long run viability of the post-
World War II liberal order. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). Some believe it may have 
been destined to fail. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the 
Liberal International Order, 43 INT’L SECURITY 7 (Spring 2019). 
 85. See D. Daniel Sokol, Tension Between Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1247, 1265-66 (2015). 
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tentially destructive consequences for humanity similar to those that 
obtained prior to the advent of the liberal international order. 
The ordoliberal and the libertarian paternalist alternatives involve 
still more acute but nonetheless cognizable problems which stem from 
their lack of a thoroughgoing liberalism.  Specifying just how market 
forces result in alienation—let alone in a way that can ground concrete 
enforcement standards for prohibiting conduct that increases concentra-
tion beyond that which is needed for the requisite amount of effective 
competition—raises thorny higher order philosophical issues that may 
not admit of any practical consensus.86  That is, how does one deter-
mine whether competition is sufficiently effective to ensure adequate 
protection for individual autonomy?87  Furthermore, even if certain 
moral norms may no doubt have been integral to the development of 
liberal capitalism,88 not only does the modern American constitutional 
order provide no general substantive due process basis for imposing 
them,89 but economic substantive due process, which could in theory 
ground the fundamental economic rights envisioned by the ordoliberal 
view,90 remains in the dustbin of American legal history.91 
Libertarian paternalism faces analogous conceptual problems.  
Even if it could be shown that the state sanctioning of certain individu-
al economic preferences is consistent with a broader liberal outlook, 
behavioral economics, when applied to market behavior, faces an in-
herent difficulty in distinguishing between irrationalities caused by the 
offending biases and “efficient mistakes” in light of incomplete infor-
 
 86. See Joseph V. Coniglio, Rejecting the Ordoliberal Standard of Consumer Choice 
and Making Consumer Welfare the Hallmark of an Antitrust Atlanticism, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON. (Aug. 2017). 
 87. Similar questions arise in the context of the role of “fairness” in progressive views 
of antitrust, which also is plagued by vagueness issues. See Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem 
for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 
253, 361 (2019). That is, progressive views face a difficulty analogous to ordoliberalism in 
specifying the degree to which market concentration becomes unsatisfactory from the politi-
cal perspective of protecting democracy, rather than ordoliberalism’s unique social concerns 
with autonomy. 
 88. For a general theory of the relation between certain types of social norms and capi-
talist development, see MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF 
CAPITALISM 61, 123 (Parsons trans., Routledge Classics, 2001) (1905). 
 89. For a clear statement of this sort of view in recent case law, see Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe and of the mystery of 
human life.”). 
 90. Cf. Schweitzer, supra note 45, at 222-23 (describing ordoliberalism as a “rights-
based approach” and finding that the European Court of Justice has consistently affirmed a 
“rights-based approach” in its decisions). 
 91. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
726 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
mation.92  While correcting the former will improve market perfor-
mance, correcting the latter may not when transaction and information 
costs are greater than zero.93  As such, libertarian paternalism may be 
unable to provide a theory of behavior with greater predictive power 
than that of neoliberalism’s theory of rational expectations94 if it cannot 
identify errors in decision making that result from bias rather than in-
tendedly rational but faulty behavior given incomplete information.95 
IV. POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF NEOLIBERAL COMPETITION POLICY 
To raise issues with other theories of competition policy is not, 
however, enough to defend neoliberal competition policy and a con-
sumer welfare standard.  The pertinent underlying question, then, is 
whether a consumer welfare standard should remain the lodestar of an-
titrust enforcement.96  Upon posing this question, the problem again 
arises of identifying normative criteria—particularly those that do not 
themselves beg the question against rival standards.  Critiquing, for ex-
ample, alternatives to neoliberalism’s consumer welfare standard on 
the grounds that they do not apply neoclassical methodologies or fail to 
satisfy broader hedonic criteria97 risks not appreciating the genuinely 
socio-political purposes that commentators critical of the Chicago 
School have long believed antitrust should embody,98 and which surely 
 
 92. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Or-
igins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106. NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1048-49 (2012) 
(describing how “efficient mistakes” can occur when correcting incomplete information and 
economizing on transaction costs becomes cost-prohibitive). 
 93. Id. at 1049. 
 94. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
(1976). 
 95. Wright, supra note 92, at 1040 (“[I]f behavioral economics is to outperform price 
theory, its superiority must be proven by its greater predicative power, not merely by the 
assertion that its underlying assumptions are more ‘realistic.’ ” ); see also Milton Friedman, 
The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 15 (1953) 
(“[T]he relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not whether they are 
descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approxi-
mations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing whether 
the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.”). 
 96. See Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Anti-
trust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 847 (2014) (noting that the Sherman Act’s design as a 
“ ‘ consumer welfare prescription’ attributed to [Judge] Bork in [Reiter v. Sonotone] has 
subsequently been quoted 29 times in federal antitrust decisions”). 
 97. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare 
Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2409 (2013). 
 98. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1074 
(1979) (providing an early critique of the Chicago School along these lines). 
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played a role in the original intentions of the Sherman Act drafters.99  
Regardless of whether or not the Sherman Act should ultimately be in-
terpreted accordingly,100 a proper debate on the merits of a consumer 
welfare standard requires appealing to a neutral framework by which, 
much like the ideal of antitrust law, the winners and losers can be de-
termined.   
Some views, on the other hand, face obvious problems.  For ex-
ample, neo-structuralist approaches101 that consider the existence of a 
monopoly to be inapposite with a healthy competitive process overlook 
that not only does the existence of monopoly rents spur entry in exist-
ing markets, but the competitive processes characterizing many New 
Economy markets is one between successive monopolies that leap frog 
one another by introducing a new and superior product.102  Further-
more, it hardly bears repeating that these types of socio-political theo-
ries fail on their own terms by being unable to articulate a non-arbitrary 
standard by which enforcers can distinguish harm to competitors from 
harm to competition—among many other concerns.103  Put another 
way, theories that seek to preserve deconcentrated market structures for 
their own sake lack any limiting principle for determining when con-
duct that increases market concentration can be understood as unlaw-
ful.104 
A consumer welfare standard, however, can also risk problems in 
its application, specifically as it concerns measuring conduct that in-
volves noticeable tradeoffs between static and dynamic welfare105—
 
 99. See, e.g., Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 
(2013); Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: 
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 98-106 (1982). 
 100. For a textualist defense of a consumer welfare standard, see Joseph V. Coniglio, 
How the “New Brandeis Movement” Already Overshoots the Mark: Sketching an Alterna-
tive Theory for Understanding the Sherman Act as a Consumer Welfare Prescription, 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L N. AM. COLUMN (Oct. 2017). For a contrary view, see Robert H. 
Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Prevent-
ing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 (2013). 
 101. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antitrust Debate, 
9(3) JECLAP 131, 132 (2018). 
 102. See, e.g., Coniglio, supra note 30. 
 103. See Muris & Nuechterlein, supra note 20, at 8-9. 
 104. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and Inequality of Wealth, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON. (Oct. 2017). 
 105. See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: 
Do We Have An Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?, in REGULATING 
INNOVATION: COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY 240-41 
(2011) (discussing how, while perhaps not impossible, the economic tools to measure 
tradeoffs between static and dynamic competition by examining technical rates of substitu-
tion are not yet available); see also Harold Demsetz, The Intensity and Dimensionality of 
Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL 
COMMENTARIES 137, 144 (1995). 
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which can be particularly acute in the New Economy markets charac-
terized by innovation competition that are often a focus of regulators.  
That is, although it is clear that consumer welfare is a broad concept 
that includes harm to innovation,106 it may be very difficult in practice 
for competition enforcers to determine the net welfare effects of con-
duct that, for example, harms product market competition but also re-
sults in cognizable dynamic efficiencies.107  In the current debate, nei-
ther economic decision criteria nor the structuralist foil may therefore 
be the best way to evaluate the merits of a consumer welfare standard. 
As another basis for evaluating a consumer welfare standard, one 
might understand harm to competition in terms of the larger ethic of 
rivalry and entrepreneurship that presumably underlies all forms of 
capitalism.  Indeed, the putative tension between the sort of monopoly 
capitalism or “corporatism,” associated with a neoliberal competition 
policy and entrepreneurship was famously highlighted by no less an 
economist than the renowned Joseph Schumpeter, and presents a far 
more fruitful avenue than structuralism to evaluate neoliberal competi-
tion policy and a consumer welfare standard.108  Furthermore, by ana-
lyzing corporatism within a larger sociological analysis of capitalism, 
Schumpeter’s discourse may also provide a higher-order framework for 
adjudicating the merits of neoliberal competition policy in a way that 
perhaps best avoids begging the question against rival theories that 
view antitrust as implicating issues beyond the calculation of economic 
surplus. 
Schumpeter is, of course, no structuralist.109  In his landmark work 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter acknowledges a 
 
 106. See Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. On Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. On the Judi-
ciary, 115th Cong. 23-24 (2018) (Questions for Joseph Simons, Chairman, Federal Trade 
Commission), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/03/2018/oversight-of-the-
enforcement-of-the-antitrust-laws. 
 107. This type of measurement problem is not limited to the American consumer welfare 
standard.  The European Union, for example, has applied a framework that attempts to pro-
tect both dynamic consumer welfare and consumer choice. See Case T-286/09, Intel v. 
Comm’n, [2014] ECR II-0000, ¶ 31 (“Intel’s anticompetitive conduct thereby resulted in a 
reduction of consumer choice and in lower incentives to innovate.”). However, there are 
many examples of business conduct that lower consumer choice while increasing incentives 
to innovate, and which would involve a similar sort of tradeoff. See Joshua D. Wright and 
Doug Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2405, 2411 (2013). But see Neil Averitt and Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer 
Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 176 (2007). Indeed, it may be 
that these latter types of tradeoffs pose larger problems of commensurability that do not ex-
ist in the case of measuring net welfare effects. See Coniglio, supra note 86. 
 108. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 131-42. 
 109. Some commentators have attempted to present an alternative “Austrian” critique of 
corporatism grounded in the work of Friedrich Hayek, and specifically his famous 
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“very common type of social criticism” which “laments the ‘decline of 
competition,’” but notes that “[e]conomically neither the case for com-
petition nor the case against concentration of economic control is any-
thing as strong or weak as this argument implies.”110  Rather: 
[s]ince capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to au-
tomatize progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself super-
fluous—to break to pieces under the pressure of its own success. 
The perfectly bureaucratized giant industrial unit not only ousts the 
small or medium-sized firm and ‘expropriates’ its owners, but in 
the end it also ousts the entrepreneur and expropriates the bour-
geoisie as a class . . . .111 
Neither, however, does Schumpeter appear satisfactory to the ne-
oliberal economist.  In fact, he expressly disclaims a defense of corpo-
ratism112 on utilitarian grounds: 
[b]ut I am not going to sum up as the reader presumably expects me 
to.  That is to say, I am not going to invite him, before he decides to 
put his trust in an untried alternative advocated by untried men, to 
look once more at the impressive economic and the still more im-
pressive cultural achievement of the capitalist order and at the im-
mense promise held out by both.  I am not going to argue that that 
achievement and that promise are in themselves sufficient to sup-
port an argument for allowing the capitalist process to work on and, 
as it might easily be put, to lift poverty from the shoulders of man-
kind.113 
Simply put, for Schumpeter “[e]conomically and sociologically, 
directly and indirectly, the bourgeoisie . . .  depends on the entrepre-
neur and, as a class, lives and will die with him.”114  The core Schum-
peterian justification of capitalism thus sounds in the ethic of entrepre-
neurialism—a spirit that would seem far removed from the utilitarian 
calculus that prevails amongst the corporate managers and technocratic 
intellectuals—that is, Burke’s “sophisters, economists, and calcula-
tors”—that preside over the neoliberal corporatist order and, with it, 
 
knowledge problem. See BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM 
AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 249-50 (2009). For a discussion of why Hayek’s 
theory of knowledge does not support a structuralist competition policy, see Joseph V. Co-
niglio, Hayek as a New Brandeisian? The Need to Distinguish Theory from Practice in Hay-
ekian Competition Policy, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L N. AM. COLUMN (Oct. 2018). 
 110. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 140. 
 111. Id. at 134. 
 112. In lieu of a tendency “expropriate” its owners, we may also identify this form of 
capitalism with the separation of ownership and control, See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), with 
profit-maximization the managers’ singular goal. 
 113. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 129. 
 114. Id. at 134. 
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enforcement of a consumer welfare standard.  As the development of 
capitalism undermines the role of the entrepreneur by replacing him 
with both automation and depersonalized corporate forms, the “bour-
geois fortress thus becomes politically defenseless.”115  Hence, rather 
than represent the empowerment of the many against the Old Order, a 
Schumpeterian observer of capitalism “might well wonder whether in 
the end such complete emancipation was good for the bourgeois and 
his world.”116   
Schumpeter’s apparent privileging of the entrepreneurial ethic as a 
necessary, rather than merely sufficient, condition for the survival of 
capitalism can be faulted on at least two grounds.  First, since Schum-
peter first wrote Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, the unprece-
dented post-World War II achievements in economic growth, techno-
logical progress and reducing poverty around the world seem to have 
established the utilitarian justification of neoliberal capitalism as suffi-
cient in its own right—as distinct from the “psycho-sociological super-
structure” of entrepreneurship analyzed by Schumpeter.117  This is to 
say, simply, that modernity’s great capitalist revolution—with the great 
possibilities for technological progress perhaps the biggest surprise—
may after all have made the many better off, who should therefore have 
the conviction to defend neoliberal capitalism on these utilitarian 
grounds. 
Put differently, even if Schumpeter may have been able to argue 
in 1942, amidst the destruction of Europe and the encroaching spectre 
of communism, that “[a]s regards the economic performance, it does 
not follow that men are ‘happier’ or even ‘better off’ in the industrial 
society of today than they were in a medieval manor or village,”118 the 
subsequent and unprecedented global economic growth, technological 
progress, reductions in poverty, and victory over communism in the 
Cold War made humanity generally better off before capitalism took its 
revolutionary course.119  As an economic matter, that would seem to be 
beyond dispute.  Even if, as Schumpeter intimates, capitalism and the 
modern liberal order may be critiqued from the vantage point of higher 
questions of “Meaning”—that the “stock exchange is a poor substitute 
for the holy grail”120—post-World War II economic history does none-
theless provide a justification for neoliberal capitalism—albeit perhaps 
 
 115. Id. at 143. 
 116. Id. at 135. 
 117. Id. at 121. 
 118. Id. at 129. 
 119. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 134-39. 
 120. Id. at 137. We will return to this indictment of capitalism as a social order writ 
large later on.   
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not neoliberal society—that would seem to be independent of the en-
trepreneurial justification Schumpeter seemed to think was essential to 
its survival.   
To be sure, the attribution of this more general success of neolib-
eral capitalism to neoliberal competition policy specifically does not 
follow necessarily.  It could be that, for example, neoliberal monetary, 
trade, and fiscal policies were the great contributors to the economic 
growth of the neoliberal period, and that neoliberal competition policy 
was not a sufficiently important factor to now claim justification from 
the successes of the broader neoliberal program—an intellectual free-
rider, it would so be alleged.  Although this is ultimately an empirical 
question well beyond the scope of this article, technological change 
and innovation are generally recognized as the greatest drivers of eco-
nomic growth.121  Furthermore, Schumpeter himself is also famous for 
his recognition that “[t]he firm of the type that is compatible with per-
fect competition is in many cases inferior in internal, especially, tech-
nological, efficiency.”122   
In replacing the structuralist paradigm which proceeded it—where 
a desire to protect small businesses resulted in mergers amounting to a 
combined market share of less than 8% being unlawful123—a consumer 
welfare standard therefore provided the legal framework for businesses 
that compete on the merits to realize the efficiency gains achievable 
through increased scale that can drive economic growth through tech-
nological progress.124  Indeed, commentators are increasingly high-
lighting the importance of competition policy in the economic changes 
brought about by neoliberalism—even if only to emphasize its alleged-
ly negative aspects.125  However, in recognizing the centrality of ne-
oliberal competition policy to the broader neoliberal political economy, 
obviously both the good and the bad should be taken into account.  
Simply put, the unprecedented economic growth of the post-World 
 
 121. See, e.g., Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Func-
tion, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957); see also Thomas O. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare 
Through Technological Innovation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2008).   
 122. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 106. But see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare 
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962). 
 123. See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272, 304 (1966). 
 124. See Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J. 
L. & ECON. 1, 4-9 (1973); SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 81-106. To be sure, the general 
relationship between market structure and innovation remains complex. For a discussion, 
see generally Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competi-
tion-Innovation Debate?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh 
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2006). 
 125. See, e.g., LYNN, supra note 109.   
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War II period should be seen as no more “natural” than the market 
forces it is incorrectly suggested to have assumed.   
Furthermore, even if Schumpeter were correct that entrepreneur-
ship remains the raison d’etre of capitalism, post-World War II eco-
nomic history has also presented an empirical basis for at least chal-
lenging Schumpeter’s claim that the entrepreneurial spirit must wane as 
neoliberal capitalism waxes—even before the high-tech revolution 
kicked into gear.126  The success of Microsoft, Apple, Google, Ama-
zon, and Facebook, to name the most prominent American cases, all 
involve the sort of entrepreneurial spirit that Schumpeter might have 
thought lost in late capitalism.  Rather than disappear, the entrepreneur-
ship embodied in these and other companies took a radically disruptive 
form, with many of the most valuable technology companies owing 
their prowess to either challenging powerful established players in tra-
ditional industries—such as Amazon127—or the first movers in their 
then-emerging New Economy markets—such as Facebook.128  That is, 
in the New Economy, corporatism and monopoly appear to be not nec-
essarily any more inconsistent with entrepreneurship than they are with 
competition. 
V. THE OTHER LIMITS OF ANTITRUST 
The implication of the foregoing is that the most pressing task for 
competition policymakers may not involve a rethinking of first princi-
ples.  The principles of neoliberal competition policy may have ulti-
mately been proven justified by an unprecedented period of economic 
growth, technological progress and reductions in poverty, and should 
presumably remain operative as long as they remain the best frame-
work for bringing about these ends.  Neither, as we have suggested, 
must the capitalist entrepreneur be lost in the process.  The totalitarian 
temptation to submit to general state control of the economy—whether 
it be in the form of communism from below or fascism from above—
 
 126. Peter F. Drucker, Our Entrepreneurial Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 1984), 
https://hbr.org/1984/01/our-entrepreneurial-economy. 
 127. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and Inequality of Wealth, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON. (Oct. 2017) (“[O]ften highly innovative firms are relative-
ly young upstarts facing older money and established technology. For example, one of Am-
azon.com’s principal targets . . . is Wal-Mart, which is substantially owned by the wealthiest 
family in the United States.”). 
 128. Tim Arango, Hot Social Networking Site Cools as Facebook Grows, N.Y. TIMES 
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should be resisted so as to preserve and build upon the great prosperity 
Western Civilization has managed to achieve. 
This statement will no doubt be highly unsatisfactory to many crit-
ics of neoliberalism who seek more fundamental and revolutionary 
changes.  Surely, they suggest, there must be some principled basis for 
critiquing the neoliberal status quo with which so many are frustrated.  
Indeed, there very well may be, and none of the arguments in this arti-
cle should be understood to the contrary.  The goal of this article has 
been limited to a tailored defense of neoliberal principles only as they 
relate to competition policy, broadly understood.  It does not suggest 
that neoliberal monetary, trade, and fiscal policies are also sound—let 
alone a neoliberal social order, where all the core institutions within 
society are organized according to the neoliberal principles of wealth-
maximization, empiricism, and the rest.129 
This is to say that even if neoliberalism is a sound theory as ap-
plied to the area of competition policy, neoliberal monetary policy, for 
example, may be problematic and a just target for contemporary critics.  
Similarly, claiming that competition policy should be enforced using a 
consumer welfare standard does not mean that all the organs of law and 
civil society should be oriented to maximize wealth or consumer wel-
fare, even if this economic inquiry is nonetheless informative.130  It is 
well known that several prominent neoliberals have expanded the ne-
oliberal policy apparatus beyond the regulation of market capitalism 
with which antitrust is concerned to domains typically understood to be 
beyond a purely utilitarian purview.131  However, whatever the merits 
of these broader neoliberal policy programs, the competition policy ba-
by, so to speak, should not be thrown out with the bathwater.   
Consider the charge that neoliberal policies have increased wealth 
inequality in the United States.  Some commentators attempt to link 
this increased inequality with a decline in competition132 and, by impli-
cation, consumer welfare competition policy.  Notwithstanding the in-
terest such theories appeared to have garnered from highly distin-
guished economists and policymakers, such as Nobel Laureate Joe 
Stiglitz,133 one might alternatively consider whether increasing wealth 
 
 129. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 243. 
 130. See, e.g., MESTMÄCKER, supra note 29, at 13.   
 131. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 132. See, e.g., Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares (London Bus. Sch. 
Working Paper, 2017); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The 
Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017). 
 133. See Joseph Stiglitz, Inequality, Stagnation, and Market Power: The Need for a New 
Progressive Era 4 (Roosevelt Inst. Working Paper, Nov. 2017), 
http://facultyresearch.london.edu/docs/BarkaiDecliningLaborCapital.pdf (noting how in-
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inequality and the resultant social strife are far more a result of policies 
in other areas, such as monetary policy.134  At the same time as Chica-
go School antitrust policy took root, the American economy began to 
undergo sustained expansions in the money supply and reductions in 
interest rates that, at least in theory, disproportionately reward the own-
ers of financial assets, who are more likely to be wealthy.135   
Indeed, after the financial crisis, monetary policy engaged in a tru-
ly unprecedented expansion, with the Federal Reserve lowering interest 
rates to zero and increasing its balance sheet from approximately $900 
billion before the crisis to $4.5 trillion after, most of which constituted 
either troublesome mortgage-backed securities or treasury bonds.136  
The share of wealth of the world’s richest people roughly doubled.137  
At the same time, however, one would seem to look in vain for any 
shift toward an increased laissez faire competition policy during the 
Obama administration.  Indeed, antitrust enforcement under the Obama 
administration arguably increased relative to the George W. Bush ad-
ministration, even if only at the margins and not in the area of monopo-
lization.138   
Consider further the alleged relation between large social media 
platforms and an increasingly deteriorating civil society.  Framed as a 
monopoly problem, some critics here as well see a consumer welfare 
 
creased inequality may have been caused by “changing the implicit rules of the game—new 
anti-trust standards that made the creation, abuse, and leveraging of market power easier—
and the failure of anti-trust standards to keep up with the changing evolution of the econo-
my.”). 
 134. Cf. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 427 (noting that “one of the most powerful fac-
tors for acceleration of social change is inflation.”). One could use the qualifier “neoliberal” 
to describe monetary policy over the past several decades, but it is not all clear to the author 
whether monetary policy, particularly since the financial crisis, is at all closer to Friedman 
than, say, Keynes. 
 135. See Moritz Kuhn, Moritz Schularick, and Ulrike Steins, Research: How the Finan-
cial Crisis Drastically Increased Wealth Inequality in the U.S., HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 13, 
2018),  https://hbr.org/2018/09/research-how-the-financial-crisis-drastically-increased-
wealth-inequality-in-the-u-s (describing how “the middle class has a higher share of its 
wealth in housing, whereas the rich own more stock” and that “[s]tock market booms pri-
marily boost the wealth at the top of the wealth distribution where portfolios are dominated 
by listed and unlisted business equity, thereby, increasing wealth inequality.”); Charles 
Wolf, Jr., Zero Interest, Greater Inequality?, THE RAND BLOG (Nov. 2,  2015),  
https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/11/zero-interest-greater-inequality.html. 
 136. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Pro-
grams and the Balance Sheet, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 
2020). 
 137. Don Resinger, World’s Richest People Have More Than Doubled Their Wealth 
Since 2008, FORTUNE (June 19, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/06/19/worlds-richest-
people-wealth/. 
 138. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Administration Reinvigorated Antitrust 
Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012). 
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standard as a culprit.139  And yet, both concentration and consumerism 
in the American media long predated neoliberalism and the Chicago 
School.  As to media centralization, Edward Bernays long-ago advo-
cated for a media paradigm whereby an “intelligent minority” of elites 
would use the press to administer democracy through a concerted me-
dia apparatus140—or, in the words of Walter Lippmann,141 engage in 
the “manufacture of consent.”142  As to consumerism, Bernays also 
showed how the insights of his renowned uncle, Sigmund Freud, could 
be used to encourage a mass psychology of consumerism through the 
media and other public relations tools.143 
To be sure, the inclination toward so-called anti-monopoly tools, 
including antitrust, as part of a broader project to restore American de-
mocracy should not be surprising.  Democracy and capitalism were 
revolutions from below that worked together and transformed human 
society.144  However, as a general matter, monopoly, viewed as break-
down of the atomistic capitalist ideal, is in principle neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition for the undermining of democracy: a monopo-
list may find its political power almost entirely curtailed by rival mo-
nopolists with contrary interests; conversely, a firm that lacks market 
power in the antitrust sense may be, for myriad other reasons, highly 
politically powerful.145  Simply put, the relation between monopoly and 
democracy is far more nuanced than commentators like the neo-
Brandeisians appear willing to admit.   
Indeed, a commonality that many critics of neoliberalism have 
with neoliberals in the broader social sense is the general reduction of 
social and political problems to economic forces.  That is, regardless of 
the particular societal ill, these paradigms are all apt to define the root 
problems through economic discourses such as class conflict between 
rich and poor, monopoly versus competition, or a lack of economic 
 
 139. Barry Lynn, Google and Facebook are strangling the free press to death. Democ-
racy is the loser, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/26/google-and-facebook-are-
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 140. EDWARD BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA 127 (1928). 
 141. We should note that Lippmann was not entirely removed from the neoliberal pro-
ject, see Dieter Plehwe, Introduction, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF 
THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 13 (Rob Van Horn and Philip Mirowski eds., 
2009) (noting that Lippmann’s publication of The Good Society in 1937 “marked the begin-
ning of a new dawn in the history of neoliberalism”), and was a member of the Mont Pelerin 
Society.   
 142. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 248 (1922). 
 143. See BERNAYS, supra note 140, at 75-82. 
 144. MOORE, supra note 14, at 413-32. 
 145. Coniglio, supra note 30. 
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growth.146  Indeed, it appears true to say that whereas for the classical 
Marxist the capitalist exploitation of labor is the root of all evil, for the 
neoliberal more economic growth is almost always the summum bo-
num.147  Of course, although neoliberalism is often critiqued along 
these lines as amounting to a belief in “market fundamentalism,”148 al-
ternatives like Marxism equally if not more constitute a religious ideol-
ogy—namely, the dogmatic belief that a materialist and dialectical pro-
cess of history will liberate the oppressed proletariat and establish rule 
by an intellectual class purportedly championing the interests of the 
fourth estate.149 
 
 146. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 THE NAT’L INT. 3, 6-7 
(Summer 1989) (“The materialist bias of modern thought is characteristic not only of people 
on the Left who may be sympathetic to Marxism, but many passionate anti-Marxists as well. 
Indeed, there is on the Right what one might label the Wall Street Journal school of deter-
ministic materialism that discounts the importance of ideology and culture and sees man as 
essentially a rational, profit-maximizing individual.”). 
 147. I use the qualifier “classical” here, as of course later Marxists associated with the 
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could be defined and formed in such a way as to nullify economic irrationality” they saw in 
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Balanced Economy, 80 ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECON. 345 (2009); Daniel 
Kishi, Time for a Conservative Anti-Monopoly Movement, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 
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ism”); David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2015) (describing neoliberalism in terms of an “efficiency-based 
‘market fundamentalism’ ” ); Stucke, supra note 55, at 905 (seeking a course between “lais-
sez-faire and socialist fundamentalism.”).  This idea, of course, is in concept as old as We-
ber’s identification of capitalism with the Protestant work ethic. See WEBER, supra note 88, 
at 61. 
 149. See ARNOLD TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY, ABRIDGEMENT OF VOLUMES I-VI 
399-400 (ed. D.C. Somerwell, 1946) (“Marx has taken the goddess ‘Historical Necessity’ in 
place of Yahweh for his deity, and the internal proletariat of the Western World in place of 
Jewry for his chosen people. . .”); see also ARENDT, supra note 74, at 329 (noting that even 
“Marx’s hopeful predictions that the state would wither away and a classless society emerge 
were no longer radical, no longer Messianic enough” and that “in Russia ‘the revolution was 
a religion and a philosophy . . . .’ ” ); SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 5 (writing that “Marx-
ism is a religion” in the sense of constituting “a system of ultimate ends that embody the 
meaning of life and are absolute standards” and “a guide to those ends which implies a plan 
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kind, is to be saved.”). I say “more” because while the neoliberal experiment has, as noted 
above, had important successes for which its devotees can be proud, the realization of Marx-
ism for the masses has in theory and in practice been terror and the Gulag. See, e.g., Alexan-
der Solzhenitsyn, Communism: A Legacy of Terror, Speech at the AFL-CIO 30 (July 9, 
1975) (“Both the theory and practice of communism are completely inhuman…”), available 
at https://archive.org/details/SolzhenitsynTheVoiceOfFreedom/page/n9/mode/2up; Michel 
Foucault, Le grande colère des faits, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATUR (May 9, 1977) (“In the Gu-
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beard on the false nose of Stalin were not enthused.”), translated in Jürgen Habermas, The 
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The justification for a consumer welfare standard, as well as for 
neoliberal political economy more generally, should be distinguished 
from a defense of this sense of neoliberalism as a comprehensive social 
order which, like its Marxist rival, shares in this totalitarianizing of the 
economic.150  Put simply, notwithstanding its fruits, neoliberalism 
should not become the very sort of utopian and totalitarian ideology 
that it was designed to replace.  The existence of a justification for ne-
oliberal competition policy does not mean that the wealth maximizing 
logic of the market should be the organizing principle for society writ 
large151—or even law, as a general matter.152  To paraphrase Schum-
peter, it is the higher order question of “Meaning,” upon which the in-
dictment of neoliberalism is likely most sound and most needed—
however difficult that may be to articulate.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States has been the preeminent embodiment of capital-
ism and democracy around the world.  As it transitioned through what 
we have understood as the classical liberal, progressive, and neoliberal 
phases of its political economy, it played a leading role in overcoming 
the greatest authoritarian and totalitarian forces in modern history: the 
last of the monarchies of the Old Order in World War I, national social-
ism in World War II, and communism in the Cold War.  But rather than 
 
Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault, in CRITIQUE 
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 152. See, e.g., MESTMÄCKER, supra note 29, at 13 (“Wealth maximization is no substi-
tute for the purpose of law in general.”). 
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herald a liberal and democratic end of history,153 the current crisis of 
the neoliberal order is an occasion for policymakers to reflect upon 
precisely where things may have went wrong.   
The stakes are high.  But for the United States’ unique achieve-
ments in republican government, victory in two world wars, and tech-
nological and economic progress, Schumpeter may very well have been 
proven right that the great revolution of capitalist democracy, which 
preceded over a hundred and fifty years of inter-Western wars, civil 
strife, and the resultant loss of hundreds of millions of lives, could have 
been merely a precursor154 to a far more barbaric and inhumane system 
of government than what came before it,155 and which would put to 
death by the tens of millions the very masses it claimed it would liber-
ate.156  The United States, with its unrivaled system of free enterprise, 
commitment to the rule of law, and inheritance of the Western tradition 
remains the best hope to prevent, in solidarity with its allies, the final 
triumph of such a totalitarian tragedy.   
The competition policy community, which during the neoliberal 
period accustomed itself to a comfortable and technocratic discourse 
about which conduct rules will maximize consumer welfare,157 must 
adapt its thinking by considering changes to antitrust law within the 
context of a broader debate that questions not only the consumer wel-
fare consensus, but also the neoliberal principles upon which contem-
porary antitrust is premised.  In this debate, competition policymakers 
should remain steadfast in their conviction that history has justified a 
consumer welfare standard as the lodestar of antitrust law158—even if 
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 156. See, e.g., Solzhenitsyn, supra note 149, at 7-8 (discussing how the communist sys-
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million peasants were sent off to extermination,” as well as “artificially created a famine, 
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 157. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 
(2008). 
 158. For a defense of a consumer welfare standard along similar lines, see generally Jo-
seph V. Coniglio, The Consumer Welfare Debate Comes to the FTC Hearings: Who’s on the 
Right Side of History?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L N. AM. COLUMN (Nov. 2018). 
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incremental changes are appropriate in some areas.  Simply put, the in-
ability for antitrust law to operate as an economic, social, or political 
panacea does not mean it isn’t working.   
Rather, what is good policy for antitrust law may not be good pol-
icy for all organs of society, and the fundamental problem with neolib-
eralism may not so much as involve what has been gained, but what 
has been lost—that is, so to speak, Burke’s “chivalry” or Schumpeter’s 
“holy grail”—within neoliberalism’s broader program to generalize the 
market form across society.159  Seeking to use antitrust or other market 
tools as a means to understand, let alone solve, larger social problems 
fundamentally fails to grasp the deeper forms of which societies have 
historically been constituted.160  Even if man is a homo economicus—
as he always has been161—that is certainly not all he is, and his eco-
nomic nature need not and should not come at the expense of the high-
er rational faculties that ground moral and political order.  These ques-
tions, as uncomfortable as they may be, far outstrip the search of the 
New Brandeisians and others for a golden mean in the Herfindal-
Hirschman index that balances the interests of capitalism and democra-
cy in a given market.  They are also more important.   
The hope lies not, moreover, in a return to either Jeffersonian de-
mocracy or New Deal progressivism.162  Just as the analysis of the 
problem may be better found on the classical “anthropological”163 
analysis, to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of tyranny and ochlocracy, 
a path forward for America and the West lies in its unique and millen-
nia-old tradition of republican government.  In particular, if liberal cap-
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italist democracy continues to falter,164 the United States can take the 
lead in looking back to the cosmopolitan and meritocratic model of re-
publican Rome165 that inspired Presidents166 and abolitionists167—even 
if America ultimately chartered a different course.168  The West’s abil-
ity to once again renew its civilization around a rightful heir—lest im-
posters claim the title—to its great tradition of right order, individual 
liberty, and progress in the condition of man may hang in the balance.   
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